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EVOLUTION, POPULATION THINKING, AND ESSENTIALISM* 
ELLIOTT SOBERt 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Ernst Mayr has argued that Darwinian theory discredited essentialist modes 
of thought and replaced them with what he has called "population thinking". 
In this paper, I characterize essentialism as embodying a certain conception 
of how variation in nature is to be explained, and show how this conception 
was undermined by evolutionary theory. The Darwinian doctrine of evolution- 
ary gradualism makes it impossible to say exactly where one species ends 
and another begins; such line-drawing problems are often taken to be the 
decisive reason for thinking that essentialism is untenable. However, according 
to the view of essentialism I suggest, this familiar objection is not fatal 
to essentialism. It is rather the essentialist's use of what I call the natural 
state model for explaining variation which clashes with evolutionary theory. 
This model implemented the essentialist's requirement that properties of 
populations be defined in terms of properties of member organisms. Requiring 
such constituent definitions is reductionistic in spirit; additionally, evolutionary 
theory shows that such definitions are not available, and, moreover, that 
they are not needed to legitimize population-level concepts. Population thinking 
involves the thesis that population concepts may be legitimized by showing 
their connections with each other, even when they are not reducible to concepts 
applying at lower levels of organization. In the paper, I develop these points 
by describing Aristotle's ideas on the origins of biological variation; they 
are a classic formulation of the natural state model. I also describe how 
the development of statistical ideas in the 19th century involved an abandoning 
of the natural state model. 
1. Introduction. Philosophers have tended to discuss essentialism as 
if it were a global doctrine-a philosophy which, for some uniform 
reason, is to be adopted by all the sciences, or by none of them. 
Popper (1972) has taken a negative global view because he sees 
essentialism as a major obstacle to scientific rationality. And Quine 
(1953b), (1960), for a combination of semantical and epistemological 
reasons, likewise wishes to banish essentialism from the whole of 
scientific discourse. More recently, however, Putnam (1975) and 
Kripke (1972) have advocated essentialist doctrines and have claimed 
that it is the task of each science to investigate the essential properties 
of its constitutive natural kinds. 
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In contrast to these global viewpoints is a tradition which sees 
the theory of evolution as having some special relevance to essentialist 
doctrines within biology. Hull (1965) and Mayr (1959) are perhaps 
the two best known exponents of this attitude; they are local anti-es- 
sentialists. For Mayr, Darwin's hypothesis of evolution by natural 
selection was not simply a new theory, but a new kind of theory-one 
which discredited essentialist modes of thought within biology and 
replaced them with what Mayr has called "population thinking". Mayr 
describes essentialism as holding that 
... [t]here are a limited number of fixed, unchangeable "ideas" 
underlying the observed variability [in nature], with the eidos 
(idea) being the only thing that is fixed and real, while the observed 
variability has no more reality than the shadows of an object 
on a cave wall . . . [In contrast], the populationist stresses the 
uniqueness of everything in the organic world. . . . All organisms 
and organic phenomena are composed of unique features and 
can be described collectively only in statistical terms. Individuals, 
or any kind of organic entities, form populations of which we 
can determine the arithmetic mean and the statistics of variation. 
Averages are merely statistical abstractions, only the individuals 
of which the population are composed have reality. The ultimate 
conclusions of the population thinker and of the typologist are 
precisely the opposite. For the typologist the type (eidos) is real 
and the variation an illusion, while for the populationist, the type 
(average) is an abstraction and only the variation is real. No two 
ways of looking at nature could be more different. (Mayr 1959, 
pp. 28-9). 
A contemporary biologist reading this might well conclude that essen- 
tialists had no scientifically respectable way of understanding the 
existence of variation in nature. In the absence of this, typologists 
managed to ignore the fact of variability by inventing some altogether 
mysterious and unverifiable subject matter for themselves. The notion 
of types and the kind of anti-empiricism that seems to accompany 
it, appear to bear only the most distant connection with modern 
conceptions of evidence and argument. But this reaction raises a 
question about the precise relation of evolution to essentialism. How 
could the specifics of a particular scientific theory have mattered 
much here, since the main obstacle presented by essentialist thinking 
was just to get people to be scientific about nature by paying attention 
to the evidence? The problem was to bring people down to earth 
by rubbing their noses in the diversity of nature. Viewed in this 
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way, Mayr's position does not look much like a form of local 
anti-essentialism. 
Other perplexities arise when a contemporary biologist tries to 
understand Mayr's idea of population thinking as applying to his or 
her own activity. If "only the individuals of which the population 
are composed have reality," it would appear that much of population 
biology has its head in the clouds. The Lotke-Volterra equations, 
for example, describe the interactions of predator and preypopulations. 
Presumably, population thinking, properly so called, must allow that 
there is something real over and above individual organisms. Population 
thinking countenances organisms and populations; typological thinking 
grants that both organisms and types exist. Neither embodies a resolute 
and ontologically austere focus on individual organisms alone. That 
way lies nominalism, which Mayr (1969) himself rejects. 
Another issue that arises from Mayr's conception of typological 
and population thinking is that of how we are to understand his 
distinction between "reality" and "abstraction." One natural way 
of taking this distinction is simply to understand reality as meaning 
existence. But presumably no population thinker will deny that there 
are such things as averages. If there are groups of individuals, then 
there are numerous properties that those groups possess. The average 
fecundity within a population is no more a property which we invent 
by "mere abstraction" than is the fecundity of individual organisms. 
Individual and group properties are equally "out there" to be discov- 
ered. And similarly, it is unclear how one could suggest that typologists 
held that variability is unreal; surely the historical record shows that 
typologists realized that differences between individuals exist. How, 
then, are we to understand the difference between essentialism and 
population thinking in terms of what each holds to be "real" about 
biological reality? 
Answering these questions about the difference between essentialist 
and population modes of thought will be the main purpose of this 
paper. How did essentialists propose to account for variability in 
nature? How did evolutionary theory undermine the explanatory 
strategy that they pursued? In what way does post-Darwinian biology 
embody a novel conception of variability? How has population thinking 
transformed our conception of what is real? The form of local 
anti-essentialism which I will propound in what follows will be congenial 
to many of Mayr's views. In one sense, then, our task will be to 
explicate and explain Mayr's insight that the shift from essentialist 
to populationist modes of thinking constituted a shift in the concept 
of biological reality. However, I will try to show why essentialism 
was a manifestly scientific working hypothesis. Typologists did not 
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close their eyes to variation but rather tried to explain it in a particular 
way. And the failure of their explanatory strategy depends on details 
of evolutionary theory in ways which have not been much recognized.1 
The approach to these questions will be somewhat historical. 
Essentialism about species is today a dead issue, not because there 
is no conceivable way to defend it, but because the way in which 
it was defended by biologists was thoroughly discredited. At first 
glance, rejecting a metaphysics or a scientific research program because 
one of its formulations is mistaken may appear to be fallacious. 
But more careful attention vindicates this pattern of evaluation. It 
is pie-in-the-sky metaphysics and science to hold on to some guiding 
principle simply because it is possible that there might be some 
substantive formulation and development of it. Thus, Newtonianism, 
guided by the maxim that physical phenomena can be accounted for 
in terms of matter in motion, would have been rejected were it not 
for the success of particular Newtonian explanations. One evaluates 
regulative principles by the way in which they regulate the actual 
theories of scientists. At the same time, I will try in what follows 
to identify precisely what it is in essentialism and in evolutionary 
theory that makes the former a victim of the latter. It is an open 
question to what degree the source of this incompatibility struck 
working biologists as central. As I will argue at the end of this section, 
one diagnosis of the situation which seems to have been historically 
important is much less decisive than has been supposed. 
The essentialist's method of explaining variability, I will argue, 
was coherently formulated in Aristotle, and was applied by Aristotle 
in both his biology and in his physics. 17th and 18th century biologists, 
whether they argued for evolution or against it, made use of Aristotle's 
Natural State Model. And to this day, the model has not been refuted 
in mechanics. Within contemporary biology, however, the model met 
with less success. 20th century population genetics shows that the 
model cannot be applied in the way that the essentialist requires. 
But the Natural State Model is not wholly without a home in 
contemporary biology; in fact, the way in which it finds an application 
there highlights some salient facts about what population thinking 
amounts to. 
An essentialist view of a given species is committed to there being 
some property which all and only the members of that species possess. 
'Mayr (1963) has argued additionally that essentialist errors continue to be made 
in population biology in the form of the distortions of "bean-bag genetics." The 
assumption that the fitness of single genes is independent of their genetic context 
is and has been known to be mistaken; but how this simplifying assumption is essentialist 
in character is obscure to me. 
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Since there are almost certainly only finitely many individuals in any 
given species,2 we are quite safe in assuming there is some finitely 
statable condition which all and only the members of the species satis- 
fy. This could trivially be a list of the spatio-temporal locations of the 
organisms involved. But the fact that such a condition exists is hardly 
enough to vindicate essentialism. The essentialist thinks that there 
is a diagnostic property which any possible organism must have if 
it is to be a member of the species. It cannot be the case that the 
property in question is possessed by all organisms belonging to Homo 
sapiens, even though there might exist a member of Homo sapiens 
who lacked the trait. It must be necessarily true, and not just accidental, 
that all and only the organisms in Homo sapiens have the characteristic. 
However, even this requirement of essentialism is trivially satisfi- 
able. Is it not necessarily true that to be a member of Homo sapiens 
an organism must be a member of Homo sapiens? This is guaranteed 
if logical truths are necessary. But essentialism about biology is hardly 
vindicated by the existence of logical truths. In a similar vein, if 
it is impossible for perpetual motion machines to exist, then it is 
necessarily true that something belongs to Homo sapiens if and only 
if it belongs to Homo sapiens or is a perpetual motion machine. 
This necessary truth is not a truth of logic; it is a result of the theory 
of thermodynamics. But it too fails to vindicate biological essentialism. 
What more, then, is required? 
The key idea, I think, is that the membership condition must be 
explanatory. The essentialist hypothesizes that there exists some 
characteristic unique to and shared by all members of Homo sapiens 
which explains why they are the way they are. A species essence 
will be a causal mechanism which works on each member of the 
species, making it the kind of thing that it is. 
The characterization of essentialism just presented is fairly vague. 
For one thing, a great deal will depend on how one understands 
the crucial idea of explanation. But since explanation is clearly to 
be a scientific notion, I hope that, on my sketch, essentialism has 
the appearance of a scientific thesis, although perhaps one that is 
not terribly precise. Although historically prey to obscurantism, 
essentialism has nothing essentially to do with mystery mongering, 
2If species are individuals-spatio-temporally extended lineages-as Ghiselin (1966), 
(1969), (1974) and Hull (1976), (1978) have argued, then we have our assurance of 
finitude. If, on the other hand, species are kinds of things, which may in principle 
be found anywhere in the universe at any time, then a slightly different argument 
is needed for the claim that the same species is overwhelmingly unlikely to have 
evolved twice. Such an argument is provided by considering the way in which speciation 
depends on the coincidence of a huge number of initial conditions. See Ayala (1978) 
for a summary of the received view of this matter. 
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or with the irrational injunction that one should ignore empirical data. 
It is a perfectly respectable claim about the existence of hidden 
structures which unite diverse individuals into natural kinds. 
Besides its stress on the giving of explanations, there is another 
feature of our characterization of essentialism which will be important 
in what follows. The essentialist requires that a species be defined 
in terms of the characteristics of the organisms which belong to it. 
We might call this kind of definition a constituent definition; wholes 
are to be defined in terms of their parts, sets are to be defined in 
terms of their members, and so on. Pre-Darwinian critics of the species 
concept, like Buffon and Bonnet, argued that species are unreal, 
because no such characteristics of organisms can be singled out (see 
Lovejoy 1936), and pre-Darwinian defenders of the species concept 
likewise agreed that the concept is legitimate only if constituent 
definitions could be provided. Constituent definitions are reductionis- 
tic, in that concepts at higher levels of organization (e.g., species) 
are legitimate only if they are definable in terms of concepts applying 
at lower levels of organization (e.g., organisms). It is quite clear 
that if there are finitely many levels of organization, one cannot demand 
constituent definitions for concepts at every level of organization 
(Kripke 1978). As we will see in what follows, evolutionary theory 
emancipated the species concept from the requirement that it be 
provided with a constituent definition. The scientific coherence of 
discourse at the population level of organization was to be assured 
in another way, one to which the label "population thinking" is 
especially appropriate. 
Chemistry is prima facie a clear case in which essentialist thinking 
has been vindicated. The periodic table of elements is a taxonomy 
of chemical kinds. The essence of each kind is its atomic number. 
Not only is it the case that all actual samples of nitrogen happen 
to have atomic number 14; it is necessarily the case that a thing 
is made of nitrogen if and only if it is made of stuff having atomic 
number 14. Moreover, this characteristic atomic number plays a central 
role in explaining other chemical properties of nitrogen. Although 
things made of this substance differ from each other in numerous 
respects, underlying this diversity there is a common feature. It was 
hardly irrational for chemists to search for this feature, and the working 
assumption that such essences were out there to be found, far from 
stifling inquiry, was a principle contributor to that inquiry's bearing 
fruit. 
Can an equally strong case be made for an essentialist view of 
biological species? One often hears it said that evolution undermined 
essentialism because the essentialist held that species are static, but 
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from 1859 on we had conclusive evidence that species evolve. This 
comment makes a straw man of essentialism and is in any case 
historically untrue to the thinking of many essentialists. For one thing, 
notice that the discovery of the transmutation of elements has not 
in the slightest degree undermined the periodic table. The fact that 
nitrogen can be changed into oxygen does not in any way show that 
nitrogen and oxygen lack essences. To be nitrogen is to have one 
atomic number; to be oxygen is to have another. To change from 
nitrogen into oxygen, a thing must therefore shift from one atomic 
number to another. The mere fact of evolution does not show that 
species lack essences. 
As a historical matter, some essentialists, like Agassiz (1859), did 
assert a connection between essentialism and stasis. But others 
considered the possibility that new species should have arisen on 
earth since the beginning (if they thought that there was a beginning). 
Thus, Linnaeus originally hypothesized that all species were created 
once and for all at the beginning, but later in his career he changed 
his mind because he thought that he had discovered a species, Peloria, 
which arose through cross-species hybridization (Rabel 1939, Rams- 
bottom 1938). And in Generation of Animals (II 746a30), Aristotle 
himself speculates about the possibility of new species arising as 
fertile hybrids. Countenancing such species need have no effect on 
binomial nomenclature or on deciding which characteristics of organ- 
isms to view as diagnostic. The question of when there started to 
be various kinds of things in the universe seems to be quite independent 
of what makes for differences between kinds. 
Another, more plausible, suggestion, concerning how evolution 
undermined essentialism, is this: The fact that species evolve gradually 
entails that the boundaries of species are vague. The essentialist holds 
that there are characteristics which all and only the members of a 
given species possess. But this is no longer a tenable view; it is 
just as implausible as demanding that there should be a precise number 
of dollars which marks the boundary between rich and poor. This 
is the Sorites problem. Since ancient Greece, we have known that 
being a heap of stones, being bald, and being rich are concepts beset 
by line-drawing problems. But, the suggestion goes, it was only since 
1859 that we have come to see that Homo sapiens is in the same 
boat. Thus, Hull (1965) has argued that essentialism was refuted 
because of its Aristotelian theory of definition; the requirement that 
species have nontrivial necessary and sufficient conditions runs afoul 
of the kind of continuity found in nature. 
Unfortunately, this limpid solution to our problem becomes clouded 
a bit when we consider the historical fact that many essentialists 
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conceded the existence of line-drawing problems. Thus, Aristotle in 
his History of Animals, (5888b4 ff.), remarks: 
... nature proceeds little by little from inanimate things to living 
creatures, in such a way that we are unable, in the continuous 
sequence to determine the boundary line between them or to 
say which side an intermediate kind falls. Next, after inanimate 
things come the plants: and among the plants there are differences 
between one kind and another in the extent to which they seem 
to share in life, and the whole genus of plants appears to be 
alive when compared with other objects, but seems lifeless when 
compared with animals. The transition from them to the animals 
is a continuous one, as remarked before. For with some kinds 
of things found in the sea one would be at a loss to tell whether 
they are animals or plants. 
It is unclear exactly how one should interpret this remark. Does it 
indicate that there are in fact no boundaries in nature, or does it 
mean that the boundaries are difficult to discern? From the time 
of Aristotle up to the time of Darwin, the principle of continuity 
seems to have coexisted peacefully with strong essentialist convictions 
in the minds of many thinkers (Lovejoy 1936). Bonnet, Akenside, 
and Robinet are 18th century biologists who exemplify this curious 
combination of doctrines. Does this coexistence imply that the two 
doctrines are in fact compatible, or rather, does it show that their 
conceptual dissonance was a long time in being appreciated? To answer 
this question, let us return to our analogy with the transmutation 
of elements. 
In what sense are the boundaries between chemical kinds any more 
definite than those which we encounter in biology? At first glance, 
there appears to be all the difference in the world: in the periodic 
table, we have discrete jumps-between atomic number 36 and atomic 
number 37 there are no intermediate atomic numbers to blur distinc- 
tions. But let us reflect for a moment on the mechanism of transmuta- 
tion. Consider, as an example, the experiment which settled the 
question of how nitrogen can be transmuted into oxygen (Ihde 1964, 
p. 509): 
4He + 14N--> 1 + H. 2 7 8 1 
In this reaction, the a-particle is absorbed and a proton is expelled. 
Let us ask of this process a typical Sorites question: At what point 
does the bombarded nucleus cease to be a nitrogen nucleus and when 
does it start being a nucleus of oxygen? 
There may be a precise and principled answer to this question 
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which is given by the relevant physical theory. But then again there 
may not.3 I would suggest that which of these outcomes prevails 
really does not matter to the question of whether essentialism is a 
correct doctrine concerning the chemical kinds. It may well be that 
having a particular atomic number is a vague concept. But this is 
quite consistent with that (vague) property's being the essence of 
a chemical kind. This really does not matter, as long as the vagueness 
of "nitrogen" and that of "atomic number 14" coincide. Essentialism 
is in principle consistent with vague essences.4 In spite of this, one 
wonders what the history of chemistry, and its attendant metaphysics, 
would have looked like, if the transmutation of elements had been 
a frequent and familiar phenomenon during the second half of the 
19th century. Just as the fact of evolution at times tempted Darwin 
to adopt a nominalist attitude towards species,5 so in chemistry the 
impressive taxonomy which we now have in the form of the periodic 
table might never have been arrived at, line-drawing problems having 
convinced chemists that chemical kinds are unreal. 
As a historical matter, Hull (1965) was right in arguing that essential- 
ism was standardly associated with a theory of definition in which 
vagueness is proscribed. Given this association, nonsaltative evolution 
was a profound embarassment to the essentialist. But, if I am right, 
this theory of definition is inessential to essentialism. Our argument 
31 would suggest that quantum mechanical considerations show that the concept 
of being a nucleus with a particular atomic number is a vague one. Presumably, a 
collection of protons constitutes a nucleus when the strong force which causes them 
to attract each other overcomes their mutual electromagnetic repulsion. Whether this 
happens or not is a function of the distances between the protons. But this concept-that 
of "the" distance between particles-is indeterminate. Hence, the question of whether 
something is or is not a nucleus with a particular atomic number can only be answered 
probabilistically. 
4It is probably a mistake to talk about concepts being vague simpliciter. Rather, 
one should formulate matters in terms of concepts being vague relative to a particular 
application. The issue of whether a concept is vague seems to reduce to the issue 
of whether there are cases in which it is indeterminate whether the concept applies 
or not. I would guess that practically every concept applying to physical objects is 
vague in this sense. Thus, even such concepts as "being two in number" are such 
that circumstances can be described in which it is indeterminate whether or not they 
apply to the objects in question. Degrees of vagueness can be partially defined as 
follows: If the set of circumstances in which concept P is indeterminate in its application 
is properly included in the set of circumstances in which concept Q is indeterminate, 
then Q is more vague than P. 
5Thus in his (1859), p. 52, Darwin says: "From these remarks it will be seen that 
I look at the term species, as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to 
a set of individuals closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentially 
differ from the term variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating 
forms. The term variety, again, in comparison with mere individual differences, is 
also applied arbitrarily, and for mere convenience sake." Elsewhere in (1859) (e.g., 
pp. 432-3), Darwin espouses his perhaps more dominant populationist view that, in 
spite of line-drawing problems, species are real. 
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that the gradualness of evolution is not the decisive issue in undermining 
essentialism is further supported, I think, by the fact that contemporary 
evolutionary theory contains proposals in which evolutionary gradual- 
ism is rejected. Eldredge and Gould (1972) have argued that the standard 
view of speciation (as given, for example, in Ayala 1978 and Mayr 
1963) is one in which phylogeny is to be seen as a series of "punctuated 
equilibria." Discontinuities in the fossil record are not to be chalked 
up to incompleteness, but rather to the fact that, in geological time, 
jumps are the norm. I would suggest that this theory of discontinuous 
speciation is cold comfort to the essentialist. Whether lines are easy 
or hard to draw is not the main issue, or so I shall argue.6 
Another local anti-essentialist argument has been developed by 
Ghiselin (1966), (1969), and (1974) and Hull (1976) and (1978). They 
have argued that evolutionary theory makes it more plausible to view 
species as spatio-temporally extended individuals than as natural kinds. 
A genuine natural kind like gold may "go extinct" and then reappear; 
it is quite possible for there to be gold things at one time, for there 
to be no gold at some later time, and then, finally, for gold to exist 
at some still later time. But the conception of species given by 
evolutionary theory does not allow this sort of flip-flopping in and 
out of existence: once a biological taxon goes extinct, it must remain 
so. Hull (1978) argues that the difference between chemical natural 
kinds and biological species is that the latter, but not the former, 
are historical entities. Like organisms, biological species are individu- 
ated in part by historical criteria of spatio-temporal continuity. I am 
inclined to agree with this interpretation; its impact on pre-Darwinian 
conceptions of species could hardly be more profound. But what 
of its impact on essentialism? If essentialism is simply the view that 
species have essential properties (where a property need not be purely 
qualitative), then the doctrine remains untouched (as Hull himself 
realises). Kripke (1972) has suggested that each individual human 
being has the essential property of being born of precisely the sperm 
and the egg of which he or she was born. If such individuals as 
organisms have essential properties, then it will presumably also be 
possible for individuals like Drosophila melanogaster to have essential 
properties as well. Of course, these essences will be a far cry from 
the "purely qualitative" characteristics which traditional essentialism 
thought it was in the business of discovering. 
6I am not arguing that Hull (1965) and others have misidentified the essence of 
essentialism and that their criticisms thereby fail to get to the heart of the matter. 
Essentialism, like most isms which evolve historically, probably does not even have 
an essence. Rather, I am trying to construe essentialism as a fairly flexible doctrine 
which, in at least some circumstances, can be seen to be quite consistent with the 
existence of insoluble line-drawing problems. 
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My analysis of the impact of evolutionary theory on essentialism 
is parallel, though additional. Whether species are natural kinds or 
spatio-temporally extended individuals, essentialist theories about them 
are untenable. Two kinds of arguments will be developed for this 
conclusion. First, I will describe the way in which essentialism seeks 
to explain the existence of variability, and will argue that this conception 
is rendered implausible by evolutionary theory. Secondly, I will show 
how evolutionary theory has removed the need for providing species 
with constituent definitions; population thinking provides another way 
of making species scientifically intelligible. This consideration, coupled 
with the principle of parsimony, provides an additional reason for 
thinking that species do not have essences. 
2. Aristotle's Natural State Model. One of the fundamental ideas in 
Aristotle's scientific thinking is what I will call his "Natural State 
Model". This model provides a technique for explaining the great 
diversity found in natural objects. Within the domain of physics, 
there are heavy and light objects, ones that move violently and ones 
that do not move at all. How is one to find some order that unites 
and underlies all this variety? Aristotle's hypothesis was that there 
is a distinction between the natural state of a kind of object and 
those states which are not natural. These latter are produced by 
subjecting the object to an interfering force. In the sublunar sphere, 
for a heavy object to be in its natural state is for it to be located 
where the center of the Earth is now (On the Heavens, ii, clr, 296b 
and 310b, 2-5). But, of course, many heavy objects fail to be there. 
The cause for this divergence from what is natural is that these objects 
are acted on by interfering forces which prevent them from achieving 
their natural state by frustrating their natural tendency. Variability 
within nature is thus to be accounted for as a deviation from what 
is natural; were there no interfering forces, all heavy objects would 
be located in the same place (Lloyd 1968). 
Newton made use of Aristotle's distinction, but disagreed with him 
about what the natural state of physical objects is. The first law 
of motion says that if a body is not acted upon by a force, then 
it will remain at rest or in uniform motion. And even in general 
relativity, the geometry of space-time specifies a set of geodesics 
along which an object will move as long as it is not subjected to 
a force. Although the terms "natural" and "unnatural" no longer 
survive in Newtonian and post-Newtonian physics, Aristotle's distinc- 
tion can clearly be made within those theories. If there are no forces 
at all acting on an object, then, a fortiori, there are no interfering 
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forces acting on it either. A natural state, within these theories, is 
a zero-force state. 
The explanatory value of Aristotle's distinction is fairly familiar. 
If an object is not in its natural state, we know that the object must 
have been acted on by a force, and we set about finding it. We 
do this by consulting our catalog of known forces. If none of these 
is present, we might augment our catalog, or perhaps revise our 
conception of what the natural state of the system is. This pattern 
of analysis is used in population genetics under the rubric of the 
Hardy-Weinberg law. This law specifies an equilibrium state for the 
frequencies of genotypes in a panmictic population; this natural state 
is achieved when the evolutionary forces of mutation, migration, 
selection and drift are not at work. 
In the biological world, Aristotle sets forth the same sort of 
explanatory model. Diversity was to be accounted for as the joint 
product of natural regularities and interfering forces. Aristotle invokes 
this model when he specifies the regularities governing how organisms 
reproduce themselves: 
... [for] any living thing that has reached its normal development 
and which is unmutilated, and whose mode of generation is not 
spontaneous, the most natural act is the production of another 
like itself, an animal producing an animal, a plant a plant ... 
(De Anima, 415a26). 
Like producing like, excepting the case of spontaneous generation, 
is the natural state, subject to a multitude of interferences, as we 
shall see. 
In the case of spontaneous generation, the natural state of an organism 
is different. Although in the Metaphysics and the Physics "spontane- 
ous" is used to mean unusual or random, in the later biological writings, 
History of Animals and Generation of Animals, Aristotle uses the 
term in a different way (Balme 1962, Hull 1967). Spontaneous genera- 
tion obeys its own laws. For a whole range of organisms classified 
between the intermediate animals and the plants, like never naturally 
produces like. Rather, a bit of earth will spontaneously generate an 
earthworm, and the earthworm will then produce an eel. Similarly, 
the progression from slime to ascarid to gnat and that from cabbage 
leaf to grub to caterpillar to chrysallis to butterfly likewise counts 
as the natural reproductive pattern for this part of the living world 
(History of Animals, 570a5, 551b26, 551a13). 
So much for the natural states. What counts as an interference 
for Aristotle? According to Aristotle's theory of sexual reproduction, 
ELLIOTT SOBER 
the male semen provides a set of instructions which dictates how 
the female matter is to be shaped into an organism.7 Interference 
may arise when the form fails to completely master the matter. This 
may happen, for example, when one or both parents are abnormal, 
or when the parents are from different species, or when there is 
trauma during foetal development. Such interferences are anything 
but rare, according to Aristotle. Mules-sterile hybrids-count as 
deviations from the natural state (Generation of Animals, ii, 8). In 
fact, the females of a species do too, even though they are necessary 
for the species to reproduce itself (Generation of Animals, ii, 732a; 
ii, 3, 737a27; iv, 3, 767b8; iv, 6, 775a15). In fact, reproduction that 
is completely free of interference would result in an offspring which 
exactly resembles the father.8 So failure to exactly resemble the male 
parent counts as a departure from the natural state. Deviations from 
type, whether mild or extreme, Aristotle labels "terata"-monsters. 
They are the result of interfering forces (biaion) deflecting reproduction 
from its natural pattern. 
Besides trying to account for variation within species by using the 
Natural State Model, Aristotle at times seems to suggest that there 
are entire species which count as monsters (Preuss 1975, pp. 215-16; 
Hull 1968). Seals are deformed as a group because they resemble 
lower classes of animals, owing to their lack of ears. Snails, since 
they move like animals with their feet cut off, and lobsters, because 
they use their claws for locomotion, are likewise to be counted as 
monsters (Generation of Animals, 19, 714b, 18-19; Parts of Animals, 
iv, 8, 684a35). These so called "dualizing species" arise because they 
are the best possible organisms that can result from the matter out 
of which they are made. The scale of nature, it is suggested, arises 
in all its graduated diversity because the quality of the matter out 
of which organisms are made also varies-and nature persists in doing 
the best possible, given the ingredients at hand. 
One cannot fault Aristotle for viewing so much of the biological 
domain as monstrous. Natural state models habitually have this 
characteristic; Newton's first law of motion is not impugned by the 
fact that no physical object is wholly unaffected by an outside force. 
Even so, Aristotle's partition of natural state and non-natural state 
in biology sounds to the modern ear like a reasonable distinction 
run wild. "Real terrata are one thing," one might say, "but to call 
7This characterization of Aristotle's view in terms of some information bearing entity 
is not completely anachronistic, as Delbriick (1971) points out when he (in jest) suggests 
that Aristotle should receive a Nobel Prize for having discovered DNA. 
8In this discussion of Aristotle's view of terrata, I have been much helped by Furth's 
(1975, section 11). 
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entire species, and all females, and all males who don't exactly resemble 
their fathers monsters, seems absurd." Notice that our "modern" 
conceptions of health and disease and our notion of normality as 
something other than a statistical average enshrine Aristotle's model. 
We therefore are tempted to make only a conservative criticism of 
Aristotle's biology: we preserve the form of model he propounded, 
but criticize the applications he made of it. Whether this minimal 
critique of Aristotle is possible in the light of evolutionary theory, 
remains to be seen. 
The Natural State Model constitutes a powerful tool for accounting 
for variation. Even when two species seem to blend into each other 
continuously, it may still be the case that all the members of one 
species have one natural tendency while the members of the other 
species have a quite different natural tendency. Interfering forces 
may, in varying degrees, deflect the individuals in both species from 
their natural states, thus yielding the surface impression that there 
are no boundaries between the species. This essentialist response 
to the fact of diversity has the virtue that it avoids the ad hoc maneuver 
of contracting the boundaries of species so as to preserve their internal 
homogeneity.9 This latter strategy was not unknown to the essentialist, 
but its methodological defects are too well known to be worth 
recounting here. Instead of insisting that species be defined in terms 
of some surface morphological feature, and thereby having each species 
shrink to a point, the essentialist can countenance unlimited variety 
in, and continuity between, species, as long as underlying this plenum 
one can expect to find discrete natural tendencies. The failure to 
discover such underlying mechanisms is no strong reason to think 
that none exist; but the development of a theory which implies that 
natural tendencies are not part of the natural order is another matter 
entirely. 
Aristotle's model was a fixed point in the diverse conjectures to 
be found in pre-Darwinian biology. Preformationists and epigeneticists, 
advocates of evolution and proponents of stasis, all assumed that 
there is a real difference between natural states and states caused 
by interfering forces. The study of monstrosity-teratology-which 
in this period made the transition from unbridled speculation to 
encyclopedic catalogues of experimental oddities (Meyer 1939), is 
9If one views Aristotle as excluding monstrous forms from membership in any species 
category, then one will have an extreme instance of this ad hoc strategy; no organism 
will belong to any species. Hull (1973, pp. 39-40) sees Aristotle and scholastic science 
as hopelessly committed to this futile strategy. However, on the view I would attribute 
to Aristotle, most, if not all, monstrous forms are members of the species from which 
they arose. They, like Newtonian particles which fail to be at rest or in uniform 
motion, fail to achieve their natural states because of identifiable causal forces. 
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an especially revealing example of the power exerted by the Natural 
State Model. Consider, for example, the 18th century disagreement 
between Maupertuis and Bonnet over the proper explanation of 
polydactyly. Both had at their fingertips a genealogy; it was clear 
to both that somehow or other the trait regularly reappeared through 
the generations. Maupertuis conjectured that defective hereditary 
material was passed along, having originally made its appearance in 
the family because of an error in nature (Glass 1959b, pp 62-7). 
Maupertuis, a convinced Newtonian, thought that traits, both normal 
and anomalous, resulted from the lawful combination of hereditary 
particles (Roger 1963). When such particles have normal quantities 
of attraction for each other, normal characteristics result. However, 
when particles depart from this natural state, either too many or 
too few of them combine, thus resulting in monstres par exces or 
monstres par defaut. Bonnet, a convinced ovist, offered a different 
hypothesis. For him, polydactyly is never encoded in the germ, but 
rather results from abnormal interuterine conditions or from male 
sperm interfering with normal development (Glass 1959a, p. 169). 
Thus whether polydactyly is "naturalized" by Maupertuis' appeal 
to heredity or by Bonnet's appeal to environment, the trait is never 
regarded as being completely natural. Variability in nature-in this 
case variability as to the number of digits-is a deviation from type. 
In pre-Darwinian disputes over evolution, natural states loom equally 
large. Evolutionary claims during this period mainly assumed that 
living things were programmed to develop in a certain sequence, and 
that the emergence of biological novelty was therefore in conformity 
with some natural plan. Lovejoy (1936) discusses how the Great Chain 
of Being was "temporalized" during the 18th century; by this, he 
has in mind the tendency to think that the natural ordering of living 
things from those of higher type down to those of lower type also 
represented an historical progression. Such programmed, directed 
evolution-in which some types naturally give rise to others-is very 
much in the spirit of the Natural State Model. Whether species are 
subject to historical unfolding, or rather exist unchanged for all time, 
the concept of species was inevitably associated with that of type; 
on either view, variation is deviation caused by interfering forces. 
It was generally presupposed that somewhere within the possible 
variations that a species is capable of, there is a privileged state-a 
state which has a special causal and explanatory role. The laws 
governing a species will specify this state, just as the laws which 
make sense of the diversity of kinematic states found in physics 
tell us what is the natural state of a physical object. The diversity 
of individual organisms is a veil which must be penetrated in the 
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search for invariance. The transformation in thinking which we will 
trace in the next two sections consisted in the realization that this 
diversity itself constituted an invariance, obeying its own laws. 
3. The Law of Errors and the Emergence of Population Thinking. So 
far, I have sketched several of the applications that have been made 
of Aristotle's model within biology. This strategy for explaining 
variation, I will argue in the next section, has been discredited by 
modern evolutionary theory. Our current theories of biological varia- 
tion provide no more role for the idea of natural state than our current 
physical theories do for the notion of absolute simultaneity. Theories 
in population genetics enshrine a different model of variation, one 
which only became possible during the second half of the 19th century. 
Some brief account of the evolution within the field of statistics of 
our understanding of the law of errors will lay the groundwork for 
discussing the modern understanding of biological variation. 
From its theoretical formulation and articulation in the 18th century, 
up until the middle of the 19th century, the law of errors was understood 
as a law about errors. Daniel Bernouilli, Lagrange, and Laplace each 
tried to develop mathematical techniques for determining how a set 
of discordant observations was to be interpreted (Todhunter 1865). 
The model for this problem was, of course, that there is a single 
true value for some observational variable, and a multiplicity of 
inconsistent readings that have been obtained. Here we have a 
straightforward instance of Aristotle's model: interfering forces cause 
variation in opinion; in nature there is but one true value. The problem 
for the theory of errors was to penetrate the veil of variability and 
to discover behind it the single value which was the constant cause 
of the multiplicity of different readings. Each observation was thus 
viewed as the causal upshot of two kinds of factors: part of what 
determines an observational outcome is the real value of the variable, 
but interfering forces which distort the communication of this informa- 
tion from nature to mind, also play a role. If these interfering forces 
are random-if they are as likely to take one value as any other-then 
the mean value of the readings is likely to represent the truth, when 
the number of observations is large. In this case, one reaches the 
truth by ascending to the summit of the bell curve. It is important 
to notice that this application of the Natural State Model is epistemo- 
logical, not ontological. One seeks to account for variation in our 
observations of nature, not variation in nature itself. The decisive 
transition, from this epistemological to an ontological application, was 
made in the 1830's by the influential Belgian statistician Adolphe 
Quetelet. 
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Quetelet's insight was that the law of errors could be given an 
ontological interpretation by invoking a distinction which Laplace had 
earlier exploited in his work in Newtonian mechanics.'1 Laplace 
decomposed the forces at work in the solar system into two kinds. 
First, there are the constant causes by which the planets are affected 
by the sun's gravitation; second, there are the particular disturbing 
causes which arise from the mutual influences of the planets, their 
satellites, and the comets. Laplace's strategy was a familiar analytic 
one. He tried to decompose the factors at work in a phenomenon 
into components, and to analyze their separate contributions to the 
outcome. The character of this decomposition, however, is of special 
interest: one, central, causal agent is at work on the components 
of a system, but the effects of this force are complicated by the 
presence of numerous interferences which act in different directions. 
In his book of 1835, Sur l'homme et le developpement de sesfacultes, 
ou essai de physique social, Quetelet put forward his conception of 
the average man which for him constituted the true subject of the 
discipline of social physics. By studying the average man, Quetelet 
hoped to filter out the mutifarious and idiosyncratic characteristics 
which make for diversity in a population, and to focus on the central 
facts which constitute the social body itself. Like Weber's later idea 
of an ideal type, Quetelet's conception of the average man was 
introduced as a "fiction" whose utility was to facilitate a clear view 
of social facts by allowing one to abstract from the vagaries of individual 
differences. But unlike Weber, Quetelet quickly came to view his 
construct as real-a subject matter in its own right. Quetelet was 
struck by the analogy between a society's average man and a physical 
system's center of gravity. Since the latter could play a causal role, 
so too could the former; neither was a mere abstraction. For Quetelet, 
variability within a population is caused by deviation from type. When 
the astronomer John Herschel reviewed Quetelet's Lettres sur les 
probabilites in 1850, he nicely captured Quetelet's idea that the average 
man is no mere artefact of reflection: 
An average may exist of the most different objects, as the heights 
of houses in a town, or the sizes of books in a library. It may 
be convenient to convey a general notion of the things averaged; 
but it involves no conception of a natural and recognizable central 
magnitude, all differences from which ought to be regarded as 
deviations from a standard. The notion of a mean, on the other 
'OHilts (1973, pp. 209-10). My discussion of Quetelet and Galton in what follows 
leans heavily on Hilts (1973). It has a number of points in common with Hacking's 
(1975). 
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hand, does imply such a conception, standing distinguished from 
an average by this very feature, viz. the regular marching of the 
groups, increasing to a maximum and thence again diminishing. 
An average gives us no assurance that the future will be like 
the past. A mean may be reckoned on with the most implicit 
confidence (Hilts 1973, p. 217). 
Quetelet found little theoretical significance in the fact of individual 
differences. Concepts of correlation and amount of variation were 
unknown to him. For Quetelet, the law of errors is still a law about 
errors, only for him the mistakes are made by nature, not by observers. 
Our belief that there is variation in a population is no mistake on 
our part. Rather, it is the result of interferences confounding the 
expression of a prototype. Were interfering forces not to occur, there 
would be no variation. 
It may strike the modern reader as incredible that anyone could 
view a trait like girth on this mode. However, Quetelet, who was 
perhaps the most influential statistician of his time, did understand 
biological differences in this way. He was impressed, not to say awe 
struck, by the fact that the results of accurately measuring the waists 
of a thousand Scottish soldiers would assume the same bell-shaped 
distribution as the results of inaccurately measuring the girth of a 
single, average, soldier a thousand times. For Quetelet, the point 
of attending to variation was to see through it-to render it transparent. 
Averages were the very antitheses of artefacts; they alone were the 
true objects of inquiry.l 
Frances Galton, who was Darwin's cousin,'2 was responsible for 
fundamental innovations in the analysis of individual differences. He 
discovered the standard deviation and the correlation coefficient. His 
work on heredity was later claimed by both Mendelians and biometri- 
cians as seminal, and thus can be viewed as a crucial step towards 
the synthetic theory of evolution (Provine 1971). But his interest to 
our story is more restricted. Galton, despite his frequently sympathetic 
comments about the concept of type,13 helped to displace the average 
"Boring (1929, p. 477) brings out the Aristotelian teleology contained in Quetelet's 
ideas quite well when he characterizes Quetelet as holding that "We might regard 
such human variation as if it occurred when nature aimed at an ideal and missed 
by varying amounts." 
'2Although Galton found The Origin of Species an encouragement to pursue his 
own ideas, he indicates that his interest in variation and inheritance were of long 
standing. See Hilts (1973, p. 220). 
'3In his Hereditary Genius, Galton compared the development of species with a 
many-faceted spheroid tumbling over from one facet or stable equilibrium to another. 
See Provine (1971, pp. 14-15). This saltative process insured unity of type. In spite 
of Galton's adherence to the idea of discontinuous evolution and certain other essentialist 
ELLIOTT SOBER 
man and the idea of deviation from type. He did this, not by attacking 
these typological constructs directly, but by developing an alternative 
model for accounting for variability. This model is a nascent form 
of the kind of population thinking which evolutionary biologists today 
engage in. 
One of Galton's main intellectual goals was to show that heredity 
is a central cause of individual differences. Although the arguments 
which Galton put forward for his hereditarian thesis were weak, the 
conception of variability he exploited in his book Hereditary Genius 
(1869) is of great significance. For Galton, variability is not to be 
explained away as the result of interference with a single prototype. 
Rather, variability within one generation is explained by appeal to 
variability in the previous generation and to facts about the transmission 
of variability. Galton used the law of errors, but no longer viewed 
it as a law about errors. As Hilts (1973, pp. 223-4) remarks: "Because 
Galton was able to associate the error distribution with individual 
differences caused by heredity, the distinction between constant and 
accidental causes lost much of its meaning." At the end of his life, 
Galton judged that one of his most important ideas was that the 
science of heredity should be concerned with deviations measured 
in statistical units. Quetelet had earlier denied that such units exist. 
Galton's discovery of the standard deviation gave him the mathematical 
machinery to begin treating variability as obeying its own laws, as 
something other than an idiosyncratic artefact. 
Eight years after the publication of Hereditary Genius, Galton was 
able to sketch a solution for the problem he had noted in that work: 
What fraction of the parental deviations from the norm are passed 
on to offspring? Galton described a model in which hereditary causes 
and non-hereditary causes are partitioned. Were only the former of 
these at work, he conjectured, each child would have traits that are 
intermediate between those of its parents. In this case, the amount 
of variation would decrease in each generation. But Galton suspected 
that the amount of variation is constant across generations. To account 
for this, he posited a second, counteracting force which causes 
variability within each family. Were this second force the only one 
at work, the amount of variation would increase. But in reality, the 
centrifugal and centripetal forces combine to yield a constant quantity 
of variability across the generations. An error distribution is thus 
accounted for by way of a hypothesis which characterizes it as the 
sum of two other error distributions. 
predilections (Lewontin 1974, p. 4), his innovations in population thinking were 
anti-essentialist in their consequences, or so I will argue. 
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In his Natural Inheritance of 1889, Galton went on to complete 
his investigations of the correlation coefficient, and introduced the 
name "normal law" as a more appropriate label for what had 
traditionally been called the law of errors.14 Bell curves are normal; 
they are found everywhere, Galton thought. This change in nomencla- 
ture crystalized a significant transformation in thinking. Bell curves 
need not represent mistakes made by fallible observers or by sportive 
nature. Regardless of the underlying etiology, they are real; they enter 
into explanations because the variability they represent is lawful and 
causally efficacious. 
The transition made possible by statistical thinking from typological 
to population thinking was not completed by Galton.'5 Although his 
innovations loosened the grip of essentialism, he himself was deeply 
committed to the idea of racial types and believed that evolutionary 
theory presupposes the reality of types. Both Galton and Darwin 
(1859, ch. 5; 1868, ch. 13) spoke sympathetically about the ideas 
of unity of type and of reversion to type, and sought to provide 
historical justifications of these ideas in terms of common descent. 
Unity of type was just similarity owing to common ancestry; reversion 
to type was the reappearance of latent ancestral traits. But the presence 
of these ideas in their writings should not obscure the way in which 
'4Hilts (1973, p. 228). Walker (1929, p. 185) claims that the origin of the name 
"normal curve" is obscure. It occurs in Lexis and, she says, "it is not improbable 
that the term goes back to Quetelet." As natural and inevitable as Quetelet found 
his interpretation of the bell curve in terms of the Natural State Model, by the time 
Galton's Natural Inheritance appeared in 1889, there was growing sentiment that this 
interpretation was acceptable, if at all, only as a special case. Thus we find Galton, 
in that work (p. 58), saying that "the term Probable Error is absurd when applied 
to the subjects now in hand, such as Stature, Eye-colour, Artistic Faculty, or Disease." 
A year earlier, Venn, in his The Logic of Chance (p. 42), made a similar comment: 
"When we perform an operation ourselves with a clear consciousness of what we 
are aiming at, we may quite correctly speak of every deviation from this as being 
an error; but when Nature presents us with a group of objects of every kind, it 
is using a rather bold metaphor to speak in this case also of a law of error, as if 
she had been aiming at something all the time, and had like the rest of us missed 
her mark more or less in every instance." Quotations are drawn from Walker (1929, 
p. 53). 
'5It would be important to trace the development of statistical ideas from Galton 
through Pearson and his circle to R. A. Fisher, and to see whether Pearson's positivistic 
convictions had the effect of further proscribing the idea of types on the grounds 
that it is "unscientific." Cohen (1972)' sees Galton as already adopting some positivistic 
attitudes in his idea that heredity was to be understood in terms of correlations, and 
not in terms of causal forces. Also, see Hacking's (1975) for a bold attempt to link 
Galton's innovations to other developments in nineteenth century thought. I should 
point out that a fuller treatment of the emergence of population thinking would have 
to ascribe a central role to Mendel. He, much more than Galton, provided the central 
elements of our present conception of the relation of heredity and variation. I have 
stressed Galton, however, because of his interpretation of statistics and because of 
his view of the population as a unit of explanation. 
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their theorizing began to undermine typological thinking. 
Darwin and Galton focused on the population as a unit of organiza- 
tion. The population is an entity, subject to its own forces, and obeying 
its own laws. The details concerning the individuals who are parts 
of this whole are pretty much irrelevant. Describing a single individual 
is as theoretically peripheral to a populationist as describing the motion 
of a single molecule is to the kinetic theory of gases. In this important 
sense, population thinking involves ignoring individuals: it is holistic, 
not atomistic. This conclusion contradicts Mayr's (1959, p. 28) assertion 
that for the populationist, "the individual alone is real." 
Typologists and populationists agree that averages exist; and both 
grant the existence of variation. They disagree about the explanatory 
character of these. For Quetelet, and for typologists generally, vari- 
ability does not explain anything. Rather it is something to be explain- 
ed or explained away. Quetelet posited a process in which uniformity 
gives rise to diversity; a single prototype-the average man-is mapped 
onto a variable resulting population. Galton, on the other hand, 
explained diversity in terms of an earlier diversity and constructed 
the mathematical tools to make this kind of analysis possible. 
Both typologists and populationists seek to transcend the blooming, 
buzzing confusion of individual variation. Like all scientists, they 
do this by trying to identify properties of systems which remain constant 
in spite of the system's changes. For the typologist, the search for 
invariances takes the form of a search for natural tendencies. The 
typologist formulates a causal hypothesis about the forces at work 
on each individual within a population. The invariance underlying 
this diversity is the possession of a particular natural tendency by 
each individual organism. The populationist, on the other hand, tries 
to identify invariances by ascending to a different level of organization. 
For Galton, the invariant property across generations within a lineage 
is the amount of variability, and this is a property of populations. 
Again we see a way in which the essentialist is more concerned with 
individual organisms than the populationist is. Far from ignoring 
individuals, the typologist, via his use of the Natural State Model, 
resolutely focuses on individual organisms as the entities which possess 
invariant properties. The populationist, on the other hand, sees that 
it is not just individual organisms which can be the bearers of 
unchanging characteristics. Rather than looking for a reality that 
underlies diversity, the populationist can postulate a reality sustained 
by diversity. 
I have just argued that there is an important sense in which typologists 
are more concerned with individual organisms than populationists are. 
However, looked at in another way, Mayr's point that populationists 
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assign a more central role to organisms than typologists do can be 
established. In models of natural selection in which organisms enjoy 
different rates of reproductive success because of differences in fitness, 
natural selection is a force that acts on individual (organismic) 
differences. This standard way of viewing evolution assigns a causal 
role to individual idiosyncracies. Individual differences are not the 
effects of interfering forces confounding the expression of a prototype; 
rather they are the causes of events that are absolutely central to 
the history of evolution. It is in this sense that Mayr is right in 
saying that evolutionary theory treats individuals as real in a way 
that typological thought does not (see also Lewontin 1974, pp. 5-6). 
Putting my point and Mayr's point, thus interpreted, together, we 
might say that population thinking endows individual organisms with 
more reality and with less reality than typological thinking attributes 
to them. 
To be real is to have causal efficacy; to be unreal is to be a mere 
artefact of some causal process. This characterization of what it is 
to be real, also used by Hacking (1975), is markedly different from 
the one used in traditional metaphysical disputes concerning realism, 
verificationism, and idealism (Sober 1980b). There, the problem is 
not how things are causally related, but rather it concerns what in 
fact exists, and whether what exists exists "independently" of us. 
The causal view of what it is to be real offers an explanation of 
a peculiar fact that is part of the more traditional metaphysical problem. 
Although two predicates may name real physical properties, natural 
kinds, theoretical magnitudes, or physical objects, simple operations 
on that pair of predicates may yield predicates which fail to name 
anything real. Thus, for example, "mass" and "charge" may name 
real physical magnitudes, even though "mass2/charge3" fails to name 
anything real. This is hard to explain, if reality is simply equated 
with existence (or with existence-that-is-independent-of-us). After all, 
if an object has a mass and if it has a charge, then there must be 
such a thing as what the square of its mass over the cube of its 
charge is. While this is quite true, it is not similarly correct to infer 
that because an object's mass causes some things and its charge 
causes other things, then there must be something which is caused 
by appeal to the square of its mass divided by the cube of its charge. 
Realism, in this case at least, is a thesis about what is cause and 
what is effect. 
If we look forward in time, from the time of Galton and Darwin 
to the Modern Synthesis and beyond, we can see how population 
models have come to play a profoundly important role in evolutionary 
theorizing. In such models, properties of populations are identified 
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and laws are formulated about their interrelations. Hypotheses in 
theoretical ecology and in island biogeography, for example, generalize 
over populations (see, for example, Wilson and Bossert 1971, chs. 
3 and 4). The use of population concepts is not legitimized in those 
disciplines by defining them in terms of concepts applying at some 
lower level of organization. Rather, the use of one population concept 
is vindicated by showing how it stands in law-like relations with other 
concepts at the same level of organization. It is in this way that 
we can see that there is an alternative to constituent definition. Here, 
then, is one way in which evolutionary theorizing undermined essentia- 
lism: Essentialism requires that species concepts be legitimized by 
constituent definition, but evolutionary theory, in its articulation of 
population models, makes such demands unnecessary. Explanations 
can proceed without this reductionistic requirement being met. 
If this argument is correct, there is a standard assumption made 
in traditional metaphysical problems having to do with identity which 
needs to be reevaluated. There could hardly be a more central category 
in our metaphysics, both scientific and everyday, than that of an 
enduring physical object. The way philosophers have tried to under- 
stand this category is as follows: Imagine a collection of instantaneous 
objects-i.e., objects at a moment in time. How are these various 
instantaneous objects united into the temporally enduring objects of 
our ontology? What criteria do we use when we lump together some 
time slices, but not others? This approach to the problem is basically 
that of looking for a constituent definition: enduring objects are to 
be defined out of their constituent time-slices. But, if populations 
can be scientifically legitimized in ways other than by using constituent 
definitions, perhaps the same thing is true of the category of physical 
object itself. I take it that Quine's (1953a) slogan "no entity without 
identity" is basically a demand for constituent definitions; this demand, 
which has been so fruitful in mathematics, should not be generalized 
into a universal maxim (nor can it be, if there are finitely many 
levels of organization. See Kripke 1978). 
If constituent definitions for population concepts are theoretically 
unnecessary, then we have one argument, via the principle of parsimony 
(Sober 1980a), for the view that species do not have essences. How- 
ever, there are equally pressing problems which essentialism faces 
when the Natural State Model is evaluated in the light of our cur- 
rent understanding of the origins of variability. It is to these prob- 
lems that we now turn. 
4. The Disappearance of a Distinction. The fate of Aristotle's model 
at the hands of population biology bears a striking resemblance to 
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what happened to the notion of absolute simultaneity with the advent 
of relativity theory. Within classical physics, there was a single, 
well-defined answer to the question "What is the temporal separation 
of two events x and y?" However, relativity theory revealed that 
answering this question at all depends on one's choice of a rest frame; 
given different rest frames, one gets different answers. We might 
represent the way the temporal separation of a pair of events may de- 
pend on a choice of frame as in the graph in Figure 1. As is well 
known, the classical notions of temporal separation and spatial separa- 
tion gave way in relativity theory to a magnitude that is not relative 
at all: this is the spatio-temporal separation of the two events. How 
large this quantity is does not depend on any choice of rest frame; 
it is frame invariant. Minkowski (1908) took this fact about relativity 
theory to indicate that space and time are not real physical properties 
at all, since they depend for their values on choices that are wholly 
arbitrary. For Minkowski, to be real is to be invariant, and space 
and time become mere shadows. 
Special relativity fails to discriminate between the various temporal 
intervals represented in Figure 1; they are all on a par. No one 
specification of the temporal separation is any more correct than 
any other. It would be utterly implausible to interpret this fact as 
indicating that there is a physically real distinction which special 
relativity fails to make. The fact that our best theory fails to draw 
this distinction gives us a very good reason for suspecting that the 
distinction is unreal, and this is the standard view of the matter which 
temporal 
separation 
of two events 
velocity 
of frame 
Figure 1: The temporal separation of a pair of events, relative to choices of rest 
frame. 
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was crystallized in the work of Minkowski. 
According to the Natural State Model, there is one path of foetal 
development which counts as the realization of the organism's natural 
state, while other developmental results are consequences of unnatural 
interferences. Put slightly differently, for a given genotype, there 
is a single phenotype which it can have that is the natural one. 
Or, more modestly, the requirement might be that there is some 
restricted range of phenotypes which count as natural. But when 
one looks to genetic theory for a conception of the relation between 
genotype and phenotype, one finds no such distinction between natural 
state and states which are the results of interference. One finds, 
instead, the norm of reaction, which graphs the different phenotypic 
results that a genotype can have in different environments.'6 Thus 
the height of a single corn plant genotype might vary according to 
environmental differences in temperature, as is shown in Figure 2. 
How would one answer the question: "Which of these phenotypes 
is the natural one for the corn plant to have?" One way to take 
this obscure question is indicated by the following answer: Each of 
the heights indicated in the norm of reaction is as "natural" as any 
other, since each happens in nature. Choose an environment, and 
relative to that choice we know what the phenotypic upshot in that 
environment is. But, of course, if the question we are considering 
is understood in terms of the'Natural State Model, this sort of answer 
will not do. The Natural State Model presupposes that there is some 
phenotype which is the natural one which is independent of a choice 
of environment. The Natural State Model presupposes that there is 
some environment which is the natural environment for the genotype 
to be in, which determines, in conjunction with the norm of reaction, 
what the natural phenotype for the genotype is. But these presupposi- 
tions find no expression in the norm of reaction: all environments 
are on a par, and all phenotypes are on a par. The required distinctions 
simply are not made. 
When one turns from the various phenotypes that a single genotype 
might produce, to the various genotypes that a population might 
contain, the same result obtains. Again, according to the Natural 
State Model, there is a single genotype or restricted class of genotypes, 
which count as the natural states of the population or species, all 
other genotypes being the result of interfering forces. But again, 
statistical profiles of genotypic variance within a population enshrine 
no such difference. Genotypes differ from each other in frequency; 
'6The discussion of the norm of reaction in what follows depends heavily on some 
points made in Lewontin (1977). 
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Figure 2: The norm of reaction of a given corn plant genotype, showing height as 
a function of temperature. 
but unusual genotypes are not in any literal sense to be understood 
as deviations from type. 
When a corn plant of a particular genotype withers and dies, owing 
to the absence of trace elements in the soil, the Natural State Model 
will view this as an outcome that is not natural. When it thrives 
and is reproductively successful, one wants to say that this environment 
might be the natural one. Given these ideas, one might try to vindicate 
the Natural State Model from a selectionist point of view by identifying 
the natural environment of a genotype with the environment in which 
it is fittest.'7 
This suggestion fails to coincide with important intuitions expressed 
in the Natural State Model. First of all, let us ask the question: 
What is the range of environments relative to which the fittest 
environment is to be understood? Shall we think of the natural state 
as that which obtains when the environment is the fittest of allpossible 
environments? If so, the stud bull, injected with medications, its 
reproductive capacities boosted to phenomenal rates by an efficient 
artificial insemination program, has achieved its natural state. And 
'7This selectionist suggestion needs to be made more precise by specifying the notion 
of fitness used. I will not lay out these different conceptions here. Rather, I invite 
the reader to choose the one that he or she finds most plausible. The upshot of 




in similar fashion, the kind of environment that biologists use to 
characterize the intrinsic rate of increase (r) of a population-one 
in which there is no disease, no predation, no limitations of space 
or food supplies-will likewise count as the natural environment. 
But these optimal environments are not natural, the Natural State 
Model tells us. They involve "artificially boosting" the fitness of 
resulting phenotypes by placing the genotypes in environments that 
are more advantageous than the natural environment. 
Let us consider another, perhaps more plausible, way to understand 
the range of environments with respect to which the fittest environment 
is to be calculated. Instead of taking the best of all possible environ- 
ments, why not, more modestly, consider the best of all environments 
that have been historically represented? This suggestion evades the 
second, but not the first, counterexample mentioned above. However, 
other problems present themselves. The natural state of a genotype 
is often understood to be one which has yet to occur. Perhaps every 
environment that a species has historically experienced is such that 
a given genotype in that environment results in a diseased phenotype, 
or one which is developmentally impaired in some way. The natural 
state of a genotype is often taken to be some sort of ideal state 
which may or may not be closely approximated in the history of 
the species. 
I have just argued that the idea of a fittest environment does not 
allow one to impose on the norm of reaction the kind of distinction 
that the Natural State Model requires. Precisely the same reasons 
count against construing the idea of a genotype's being the natural 
state of a species in terms of maximal fitness. It is part of the Natural 
State Model that the natural genotype for a species can be less fit 
(in some range of environments) than the best of all possible genotypes. 
And the natural genotype can likewise fail to be historically represented. 
Aristotle is typical of exponents of the Natural State Model in 
holding that variation is introduced into a population by virtue of 
interferences with normal sexual reproduction. Our current under- 
standing of the mechanisms of reproduction shows that precisely the 
opposite is the case. Even if one dismisses mutations as "unnatural 
interferences," the fact of genetic recombination in meiosis looms 
large. Generally, the number of total genotypes that a gene pool can 
produce by recombination is the product of the number of diploid 
genotypes that can be constructed at each locus. For species like 
Homo sapiens and Drosophila melanogaster, the number of loci has 
been estimated to be about 10,000 or more. What this means is that 
the number of genotypes that can be generated by recombination 
is greater than the number of atoms in the visible universe (Wilson 
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and Bossert 1971, p. 39). For species with this number of loci, even 
a single male and a single female can themselves reproduce a significant 
fraction of the variation found in a population from which they are 
drawn. All sorts of deleterious phenotypes may emerge from the 
recombination process initiated by a founder population. 
A doctrinaire advocate of the Natural State Model may take these 
facts to show that recombination has the status of an interference 
with what is natural. But this desperate strategy conflicts with the 
received evolutionary view of the function of sexuality. The deploying 
of prodigious quantities of variability is not a dysfunction which sexual 
organisms are vulnerable to. Rather it is the principal advantage of 
sexuality; it is standardly construed to be what sexuality is for (but 
see Williams 1975 for a dissenting opinion). If the notion of a natural 
state is to make any sense at all, then variability must be viewed 
as the upshot of natural forces. 
The Natural State Model is a causal, and thereby a historical, 
hypothesis. The essentialist attempts to understand variation within 
a species as arising through a process of deviation from type. By 
tracing back the origins of this variability we discover the natural 
state of a species. To do this is to uncover that natural tendency 
possessed by each member of the species. But the science which 
describes the laws governing the historical origins of variation within 
species-population genetics-makes no appeal to such "natural 
tendencies." Rather, this frame invariant "natural tendency"-this 
property that an organism is supposed to have regardless of what 
environment it might be in-has been replaced by a frame relative 
property-namely, the phenotype that a genotype will produce in 
a given environment. The historical concept of a natural state is 
discredited in much the same way that the kinematic concept of absolute 
simultaneity was. 
Our current concepts of function and dysfunction, of disease and 
health, seem to be based on the kinds of distinctions recommended 
by the Natural State Model. And both of these distinctions resist 
characterization in terms of maximum fitness. For virtually any trait 
you please, there can be environments in which that trait is selected 
for, or selected against. Diseases can be rendered advantageous, and 
health can be made to represent a reproductive cost. And even if 
we restrict our attention to historically actual environments, we still 
encounter difficulties. A perfectly healthy phenotype may be histori- 
cally nonexistent; the optimum actually attained might still be some 
diseased state. 
The functional notions just mentioned make distinctions which are 
sanctioned by the Natural State Model. Given the inadequacy of this 
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model, does this show that the difference between disease and health 
and the difference between function and dysfunction are mere illusions? 
I do not think that this follows. What we should conclude is that 
these functional notions of normality are not to be characterized in 
terms of a historical notion of fitness. Perhaps they can be understood 
in some other way; that remains to be seen. 
In addition to the influence that the Natural State Model continues 
to exert in scientific thinking,'8 perhaps even more pervasive is the 
way that notions of naturalness have had, and continue to have, 
an influence in politics and in popular culture. Political theorists of 
both the left and the right have appealed to something called "human 
nature" (Lewontin 1977, Hull 1978). Political optimists see human 
nature as essentially good; the evil that human beings have done 
is to be chalked up to interferences on the part of civilization, or 
of the state, or of particular economic institutions. Pessimists, on 
the other hand, see in human beings a natural tendency towards evil, 
which the restraints made possible by civilization can perhaps correct. 
The common presupposition here is that each human being has a 
particular dispositional property-a natural tendency-whose mani- 
festation is contingent on whether environmental forces facilitate the 
expression of what is natural, or, on the other hand, go against nature 
by imposing unnatural interferences. 
A more recent manifestation of the same habit of mind is to be 
found in debates about "environmental policy. " Current environmental 
controversy, both on the part of those who want further industrializa- 
tion to take its course and on the part of those who want to check 
or alter the way in which industry impinges on wildlife, tends to 
picture nature as something apart from us. The question before us, 
both sides imply, is how we should behave towards this separate 
sphere. We are not part of what is natural, and what we do has 
the character of an intervention from the outside into this natural 
domain. Our pollution of lakes, disruption of ecosystems, and extinc- 
tion of species is just not natural. Natural, it would seem, is a good 
thing to be nowadays. Civilization is more often than not an interfering 
force, deflecting us from what is natural. 
The Victorians, too, had their unnatural acts, thus hoping to find 
their ethics at least consistent with, and possibly vindicated by, the 
'8Lewontin (1977, p. 11) has argued that the idea of a "natural phenotype" has 
been used in some hereditarian thinking in the IQ controversy. He quotes Herrnstein 
(1971, p. 54) as talking about "artificially boosting" an individual's IQ score. The 
presupposition seems to be that each human genotype has associated with it an IQ 
score (or range of such scores) which counts as its natural phenotype. As in Aristotle, 
the individual can be deflected from what is natural by environmental interference. 
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natural order. But they, at least, maintained some distance from the 
automatic equation of natural and good. Although some unnatural 
acts were wrong, others were decidedly right: here natural tendencies 
had to be checked if morally desirable qualities were to emerge. Perhaps 
it is a sign of our crumbling moral confidence that we no longer 
find it possible to separate questions of what is natural from what 
is good. By equating the two, we hope to read off our ethics directly 
from what happens in nature, and this gives us the illusion of needing 
to make no moral decisions for ourselves. This moral buck-passing 
is incoherent. What happens in nature is simply everything that 
happens. There is no other sense of "natural". Human society is 
not external to nature but a special part of it. It is no more a part 
of human nature to be healthy than to be diseased. Both kinds of 
phenotypes are to be found, and the norm of reaction makes no 
distinction between them. If we prefer one and wish to create 
environments in which it is encouraged, let us say so. But our reasons 
cannot be given in terms of allowing what is natural to occur 
unimpeded-by letting nature take its course, as if it has only one. 
Our activity, and inactivity, requires a more substantive justification 
than this. 
5. Conclusion. Essentialism is as much entitled to appeal to the principle 
of tenacity as any other scientific hypothesis or guiding principle. 
It was hardly irrational for nineteenth century research on the chemical 
elements to persist in its assumption that chemical kinds exist and 
have essential properties. The same holds true for those who hold 
that species are natural kinds and have essential properties; repeated 
failure to turn up the postulated items may be interpreted as simply 
showing that inquiry has not proceeded far enough. Matters change, 
however, when theoretical reasons start to emerge which cast doubt 
on the existence claim. For example, if the existence claim is shown 
to be theoretically superfluous, that counts as one reason for thinking 
that no such thing exists, or so the principle of parsimony would 
suggest (Sober 1980a). In another vein, if the causal mechanism 
associated with the postulated entity is cast in doubt, that too poses 
problems for the rationality of the existence claim. Our discussion 
of how population thinking emancipated biology from the need for 
constituent definitions of species is an argument of the first kind. 
Our examination of the theory of variation presupposed by essentialism 
is an argument of the second kind. 
No phenotypic characteristic can be postulated as a species essence; 
the norm of reaction for each genotype shows that it is arbitrary 
to single out as privileged one phenotype as opposed to any other. 
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Similar considerations show that no genotypic characteristic can be 
postulated as a species essence; the genetic variability found in sexual 
populations is prodigious and, again, there is no biologically plausible 
way to single out some genetic characteristics as natural while viewing 
others as the upshot of interfering forces. Even if a species were 
found in which some characteristic is shared by all and only the 
organisms that are in the species, this could not be counted as a 
species essence. Imagine, for example, that some novel form of life 
is created in the laboratory and subjected to some extreme form 
of stabilizing selection. If the number of organisms is kept small, 
it may turn out that the internal homogeneity of the species, as well 
as its distinctness from all other species, has been assured. However, 
the explanation of this phenomenon would be given in terms of the 
selection pressures acting on the population. If the universal property 
were a species essence, however, explaining why it is universal would 
be like explaining why all acids are proton donors, or why all bachelors 
are unmarried, or why all nitrogen has atomic number 14. These 
latter necessary truths, if they are explainable at all, are not explained 
by saying that some contingent causal force acted on acids, bachelors 
or samples of nitrogen, thereby endowing them with the property 
in question. Characteristics possessed by all and only the extant 
members of a species, if such were to exist, would not be species 
essences. It is for this reason that hypotheses of discontinuous 
evolution like that proposed by Eldredge and Gould (1972) in no 
way confirm the claims of essentialism. 
The essentialist hoped to penetrate the veil of variability found 
within species by discovering some natural tendency which each 
individual in the species possesses. This natural tendency was to 
be a dispositional property which would be manifest, were interfering 
forces not at work. Heterogeneity is thus the result of a departure 
from the natural state. But, with the development of evolutionary 
theory, it turned out that no such property was available to the 
essentialist, and in fact our current model of variability radically differs 
from the essentialist's causal hypothesis about the origins of variability. 
At the same time that evolutionary theory undermined the essential- 
ist's model of variability, it also removed the need for discovering 
species essences. Characteristics of populations do not have to be 
defined in terms of characteristics of organisms for population concepts 
to be coherent and fruitful. Population biology attempts to formulate 
generalizations about kinds of populations. In spite of the fact that 
species cannot be precisely individuated in terms of their constituent 
organisms, species undergo evolutionary processes, and the character 
of such processes is what population biology attempts to describe. 
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Laws generalizing over population will, of course, include the standard 
ceteris paribus rider: they will describe how various properties and 
magnitudes are related, as long as no other forces affect the system. 
At least one such law describes what happens when no evolutionary 
force is at work in a panmictic Mendelian population. This is the 
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium law. This law describes an essential 
property-a property which is necessary for a population to be 
Mendelian. But, of course, such laws do not pick out species' essences. 
Perhaps essentialism can reemerge as a thesis, not about species, 
but about kinds of species. The Natural State Model arguably finds 
an application at that level of organization in that the Hardy-Weinberg 
zero-force state is distinguished from other possible population config- 
urations. 
The transposition of Aristotle's distinction is significant. The essen- 
tialist searched for a property of individual organisms which is invariant 
across the organisms in a species. The Hardy-Weinberg Law and 
other more interesting population laws, on the other hand, identify 
properties of populations which are invariant across all populations 
of a certain kind. In this sense, essentialism pursued an individualistic 
(organismic) methodology,19 which population thinking supplants by 
specifying laws governing objects at a higher level of organization. 
From the individualistic (organismic) perspective assumed by essen- 
tialism, species are real only if they can be delimited in terms of 
membership conditions applying to individual organisms. But the 
populationist point of view made possible by evolutionary theory made 
such reductionistic demands unnecessary. Since populations and their 
properties are subject to their own invariances and have their own 
causal efficacy, it is no more reasonable to demand a species definition 
in terms of the properties of constituent organisms than it is to require 
organismic biology to postpone its inquiries until a criterion for 
sameness of organism is formulated in terms of relations between 
constituent cells. Essentialism lost its grip when populations came 
to be thought of as real.20 And the mark of this latter transformation 
in thought was the transposition of the search for invariances to a 
higher level of organization.21 
'9It is significant that biologists to this day tend to use "individual" and "organism" 
interchangeably. For arguments that populations, and even species, are to be construed 
as individuals, see Ghiselin (1966), (1969), (1974), and Hull (1976), (1978). 
20I borrow this way of putting matters from Hacking's (1975) in which he describes 
the series of transformations in thought which resulted in "chance becoming real." 
2'The group selection controversy provides an interesting example of the question 
of whether, and in what respects, it is appropriate to view populations as objects. 
In some ways, this debate recapitulates elements of the dispute between methodological 
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